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Gender Interactions within Hierarchies: 
Evidence from the Political Arena
*
 
This paper studies gender interactions within hierarchical organizations using a large data set 
on the duration of Italian municipal governments elected between 1993 and 2003. A 
municipal government can be viewed as a hierarchy, whose stability over time depends on 
the degree of cooperation between and within ranks. We find that in municipalities headed by 
female mayors, the probability of early termination of the legislature is higher. This result 
persists and becomes stronger when we control for municipality fixed effects as well as non-
random sorting of women into municipalities using regression discontinuity in gender-mixed 
electoral races decided by a narrow margin. The likelihood that a female mayor survives until 
the end of her term is lowest when the council is entirely male, and in regions with less 
favorable attitudes towards working women. The evidence is suggestive that female mayors 
are less able at fostering cooperation among men, or alternatively, that men are more 
reluctant to be headed by women. Other interpretations receive less support in the data. Our 
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collection. 1 Introduction
Despite the substantial increase in female labor force participation over the past 40 years,
and the narrowing of the gender gap in wages, women are still underrepresented in leader-
ship positions, in the corporate world, in academia, in government and in other prestigious
professions.1 Most of the existing research has focused on trying to explain the reasons for
this phenomenon. However, relatively little is known about how women actually fare once
they have reached the top of an organization. In this paper, we attempt to ﬁll this gap by
investigating the performance of one particular type of leaders, elected politicians in mu-
nicipal governments. Speciﬁcally, we use a unique and very rich data set on the universe
of Italian municipal governments elected between 1993 and 2003, and we ask whether the
probability that the elected administration survives until the end of its mandate depends on
the gender of the chief of the executive.
The Italian municipal system is a parliamentary system, with the government organized
as a hierarchy. The mayor, who is directly elected, is appointed to run the executive, and
members of the assembly endorse or oppose the proposed policies. As in any organization,
the stability and success of the municipal government depends on the degree of cooperation
between and within ranks. A mayor who cannot muster a majority of assembly members in
support of his or her policies can be forced out of oﬃce by a simple no-conﬁdence vote in
the council. This leads to the immediate termination of the mandate and to new elections.
Hence, the chief of the executive’s survival in oﬃce will depend on the ability to forge and
maintain stable majorities that will endorse the proposed policies. Our research question,
then, is about the relative ability of male and female mayors to foster cooperation among
the assembly members, and especially those in the governing coalition.
Our main ﬁnding is that the probability of early termination of the legislature is between
3 and 5 percentage points higher when the mayor is a woman. This is also true after control-
1Bertrand and Halloc (2001) document that women represent only 2.5% of the top paid executives in
U.S. corporate ﬁrms.
1ling for a large number of observable characteristics of the mayor and the council, and for
municipalityﬁxed eﬀects. We ﬁnd an even larger eﬀect when controlling for non-random sort-
ing of women across municipalities using a regression discontinuity design in gender-mixed
electoral races decided by a narrow margin (between 6 and 8 percentage points).
We discuss a number of possible explanations for these ﬁndings. Perhaps female leaders
are discriminated against by their predominantly male subordinates, who dislike the idea of
being led by a woman. This hypothesis receivessome support in the data, since the likelihood
that a female mayor survives until the end of her term is lowest when the mayor interacts
with an entirely male council, and in the Southern regions, where unfavorable attitudes
towards working women prevail. Alternative explanations receive less support in the data.
For example, if women are less combative, they may choose to resign spontaneously, rather
than be forced out of oﬃce by a no-conﬁdence vote or by resignation of the city council.
However, the opposite holds true: female mayors are signiﬁcantly more likely to be ousted
from oﬃce by resignation of the city council, but are no more likely to resign spontaneously.
We also ﬁnd no evidence that female mayors encounter more resistance because they are
likely to be perceived as reformers: the gender diﬀerence in survival probability is robust to
the inclusion of a large number of personal characteristics of the elected mayor (including age
and previous experience in municipal government), while there are essentially no diﬀerences
between male and female mayors in policies enacted.
Our study presents a unique opportunity to analyze the interaction between the gender
of team members and the team leader in an important real world setting, where we can
credibly measure performance. The size and the dynamics of a municipal council are similar
to those of a company’s board of directors: our analysis can therefore shed light on the role
of cooperativeness in settings that go beyond the political arena.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we reviewthe related literature.
In Section 3, we describe the data. In Section 4, we present the results showing the eﬀect
of the mayor’s gender on the probability of early termination. In Section 5 we discuss the
2possible interpretations of our ﬁndings. We conclude with Section 6.
2 Related Literature
This paper is related diﬀerent strands of research. First, it is connected to the recent research
aimed at understanding the underrepresentation of women in leadership roles and at the very
top of the occupational distribution. Some have hypothesized that this phenomenon may
be due to gender diﬀerences in competitive environments. Men are more likely to select into
more competitive compensation schemes (Dohmen and Falk, 2006; Niederle and Vesterlund,
2007; Niederle and Yestrumskas, 2008; Booth and Nolen, 2009), they tend to raise their
performance in competitive settings (Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini, 2003; Gneezy and
Rustichini, 2004) and are better able to maintain high levels of performance in high pressure
situations (Lavy, 2008a; Paserman 2008; ¨ Ors, Palomino and Peyrache, 2008).2
However, in the setting that we are examining it is actually cooperative attitudes, more
than competitive ones, that probably matter most. Popular wisdom has it that women, while
perhaps lacking in competitive spirit, are actually better able at fostering cooperation among
subordinates and, more generally, at bringing people together to work towards a common
goal. The experimental evidence on this issue, however, is mixed: some studies showing
that women are more concerned for the outcome of other party (Andreoni and Vesterlund,
2001; Eckel and Grossman, 1996 and 1998; Nowell and Tinkler, 1994), but others ﬁnding
no eﬀects (Croson and Buchan, 1999), or eﬀects of the opposite sign (Brown-Kruse and
Hummels, 1993).3
This paper is also related to the large and expanding literature on the choices and per-
formance of female politicians. A series of recent articles has highlighted important gender
2On the other hand, Lavy (2008b) ﬁnds no gender diﬀerences in performance in a tournament in which
contestants have more time to prepare and plan their strategies, and Manning and Saidi (2008) argue that
gender diﬀerences in the incidence of pay-for-performance schemes can account for only a small fraction of
the gender gap in the United Kingdom.
3See Croson and Gneezy (2008) for a survey of the experimental literature on gender diﬀerences in
competitive and cooperative environments.
3diﬀerences in preferences for policies. Femaleleaders investmore in public goods more closely
linked to women’s concerns, like water provision (Chattopadhyay and Duﬂo, 2004), educa-
tion (Clots-Figueras, 2008), health (Rehavi, 2007), and environmental protection (Funk and
Gathman, 2008). This evidence is in line with the rich literature in political science that has
investigated gender diﬀerences in legislators’ voting behavior, using mostly data from the
U.S. Congress. Studies have found that women tend to be more liberal than men (Welch,
1985; Norton, 1995), and more likely to support and promote women’s issues (Swers, 1998,
Vega and Firestone, 1995). Another strand of the literature has examined whether female
legislators are as eﬀective as their male colleagues in sponsoring bills that are eventually
turned into law (Bratton and Haynie, 1999; Jeydel and Taylor, 2003).4
With respect to the existing literature, the contribution of our paper is twofold. First, we
shed new light on gender interactions within hierarchical environments. To the best of our
knowledge, this aspect has been almost neglected in previous economic research, probably
because of the absence of ﬁeld data that allows the analysis of gender interactionsin relatively
small teams. Second, we analyze an additional dimension of politicians’ eﬀectiveness, which
had not received much attention previously.
3T h e D a t a
We use an administrative data set containing all the Italian mayoral terms elected from 1993
to 2008. The data set contains information on gender, age, highest educational attainment,
political aﬃliation, and previous job of the electedmayor, of all the losing mayoral candidates,
of the members of the executive committee, and of the members of the council (divided into
those belonging to the mayor’s coalition, and those who do not). It also contains information
on the legislature, such as the exact duration and the reasons of early termination, and the
4Other aspects of gender diﬀerences in politics include studies of gender stereotypes of candidates (Huddie
and Terklidsen, 1993; Sanbonmatsu, 2002), and their interplay with campaign strategies (Herrnson, Lay and
Stokes-Brown, 2003); gender diﬀerences in electoral behavior (Sapiro and Conover, 1997), and the evolution
of the political gender gap (Box-Steﬀensmeier, De Boef and Lin, 2004; Edlund and Pande, 2002).
4electoral results for the ﬁrst and the second ballot, including turnout rates by gender. We
also have yearly information at the municipality levelon population,.on total revenues and on
expenditure (both in total and by components). Finally we have a number of demographic
and economic indicators as of 2005: disposable income after taxes per capita, the labor force
participation rate, the number of productive units per capita and the old-age index,5
3.1 The Italian Institutional Framework
The Italian municipal administration (Comune)i sh e a d e db yaM a y o r( Sindaco), who su-
pervises the Executive Committee (Giunta), and a Council (Consiglio Comunale)w h i c he n -
dorses the policies proposed by the mayor with majority rule. The functions of a municipal
administration include the provision of public transportation, some welfare (like assistance
to elderly people, nursery schools, and public housing), contracting for public works and
managing public utilities.
In 1993 the mayoral electoral system was changed from a party-ballot to an individual-
ballot election of the mayor, with some diﬀerences depending on the size of the city. If the
population size is smaller than 15,000 inhabitants, elections are held with a single ballot and
plurality rule and the winning candidate is awarded a majority premium of at least two-
thirds of the seats in the council. In municipalities with population above 15,000, elections
are held with a double ballot (one for the mayor, and one for the party list), and a runoﬀ
election is held only if none of the candidates in the ﬁrst round obtained an absolute majority
of the votes. The winning candidate is awarded a majority premium of at least 60 percent
of the seats in the council.6 Mayors are subject to a two-terms limit, unless one of the two
5The labor force participation rate is the ratio of active population (15-64) over the whole population.
The old-age index is deﬁned as the ratio of population above age 65 over population below age 14. All the
data were provided by the Statistical Oﬃce of the Italian Ministry of Interiors.
6Some institutional features diﬀer in the regions with special autonomy (Regioni Autonome a Statuto
Speciale), namely Sicily, Val D’Aosta and Trentino Alto Adige (but not Friuli-Venezia-Giulia and Sardinia,
which followed the national legislation). In Sicily the majority premium is 60 percent and elections are held
with double ballot no matter the size of the municipality, although in municipalities with more than 10,000
inhabitants 30 percent of the seats are assigned with party-ballot. In Val D’Aosta the majority premium is
60 percent no matter the size of the municipality. Finally, in Trentino Alto Adige the majority premium is
5terms lasted for less than two years. In 2000 the statutory duration of the legislature was
extended from four to ﬁve years.
What makes the Italian municipal government peculiar is that it has some features of
both the parliamentary and the presidential systems coexisting together. In fact, in the case
of early resignation of the mayor or of at least 50 percent of the councilors, anticipated
elections are called without the possibility of forming a new governing coalition.
3.2 Descriptive Statistics
3.2.1 Diﬀerences by Gender
We have data on more than 8,000 municipalities and 18,000 mayoral terms, 6.7 percent
of which were headed by a female mayor.7 As we can see in Table 1, female mayors are
substantially younger and lessexperienced (eitheras mayors or in other positions in municipal
government), and more likely to have been not employed previously. On the other hand,
they are markedly more educated than their male counterparts. Municipalities with female
mayors are less likely to be in the South, have a higher labor force participation rate, more
economic activity, and are richer, but they are no diﬀerent in size relative to municipalities
with male mayors. Female mayors tend to serve in councils with a slightly higher female
representation, and there are also more females in the mayor’s coalition. Unsurprisingly, this
also means that councilors and coalition members are less experienced when the mayor is
female. There are no diﬀerences, however, in the average educational attainment of the city
councilors.8
60 percent and municipalities with less than 3,000 inhabitants in the province of Trento (less than 15,000
inhabitants in the province of Bolzano) have a single ballot, while the others have a double ballot.
7A detailed description of mayors’ and cities’ characteristics can be found in Tables A1 and A2.
8One possible concern whe using a non-random subsample of the population, such as mayors, is that the
process of selection into politics might be diﬀerent between men and women, and this might prejudice the
external validity of our results. However, comparing the elected mayors in our sample with a random sample
of the Italian population (obtained from the Bank of Italy’s Survey on Household Income and Wealth –
SHIW) reveals that there are only small diﬀerences in key observable characteristics (age, education, and
employment status). Moreover, there does not seem to be any diﬀerential pattern of selection by gender.
63.2.2 Deﬁning the Dependent Variable
Our main outcome of interest is a dummy variable indicating whether the municipal leg-
islature failed to complete its term for one of the following reasons: a) the resignation of
the mayor (27.56 percent of the cases); or b) the resignation of the majority of the council
or a no-conﬁdence vote in the council (56.41 percent).9 Other technical reasons for early
termination include, among other, the death of the mayor (8.54 percent), or the mayor being
charged for a crime (0.92 percent).10 Since these latter events are not related to the ability
of a mayor to forge and maintain a political coalition, but rather idiosyncratic events, we
code them as zeros.11
The resignation of the mayor is usually anticipated by higher resignation rates among
the members of the executive committee (16.7 percent, against 10.3 percent in case of no
resignation of the mayor), as well as among the councilors in the mayor’s coalition (5.8
percent, against 4.1 percent). However, since withdrawing councilors are replaced with the
next candidates in the electoral list, this phenomenon is not important for our analysis unless
it concerns at least 50 percent of the council, in which case anticipated elections are called
and the dependent variable is coded as 1.
One potential concern with our dependent variable is that it may have little to do with
cooperation between the mayor and the city councilors. Rather, a mayor may choose strategi-
cally to resign early and run for re-election, in order to obtain a larger (and more manageable)
majority in the subsequent election. We do not view this scenario as particularly likely: ﬁrst,
the two-term limit, the cost of campaigning, and the possibility to lose the mayoral monthly
salary (which ranges from 1,300 to 8,000 euros according to population size) act to reduce
the incentivesof mayors to resign voluntarily.12 Second, in the case of early termination (and
9In 0.05 percent of these cases, the mayor was then elected in the national parliament; in 5.5 percent in
the regional government; and in 0.6 percent in the provincial government.
10The remaining reasons of early termination include the fusion of the municipality with another one, the
annulment of the election for administrative reasons, and upcoming incompatibilities.
11In doing this we follow Diermeier and Stevenson (1999). The results are not sensitive to excluding all
observations in which the legislature terminated early because of one of these reasons.
12Mayors can keep their private job while appointed. However, in case the mayor works as an employee,
7no binding term limit), the percentage of mayors who will then run for re-election is only 37
percent; and, while about 58 percent succeed in being reelected, there is no evidence that
they are able to increase the size of their majority, or to change the equilibrium within their
coalition (the fraction of seats in the mayor’s party decreases from 36 to 34 percent, but the
diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant).
In Table 2, we present the mean of the dependent variable, separately by gender and
by a number of important covariates. Even though we have data up to the end of 2008,
we restrict the sample only to those mayoral terms appointed between the 1993 electoral
reform, for which we have the electoral and budget information, and December 2003, for
which we can know with certainty whether the legislature was terminated before completing
its full term. First, we note that experience matters a great deal in securing a complete
mandate. Mayors in their ﬁrst term or with less than 5 years in municipal politics are
about 60 percent more likely to be forced into early resignation. There are also important
diﬀerences by region and by type of municipality: the probability of early termination is
much higher in the South and in large municipalities, and is smaller in municipalities with
per capita income above the median (this last variable in part captures the large regional
diﬀerences in per capita income). Large municipalitiesare probably more diﬃcult to manage,
as are municipalities in the relatively impoverished and crime-infested Italian South. The
probability of early termination increases monotonically as the number of parties represented
in the council rises: governments are less stable when there are a large number of conﬂicting
interests. Finally, it appears that the probability of early termination is highest for mayors
aﬃliated with right and center-right parties, and (to a lesser extent) with separatist and
regional movements (such as the Northern League).
Strikingly, in almost all of the above subcategories we ﬁnd that women are more likely
to resign early than men. The last grouping of variables is especially informative: the
probability of early resignation decreases monotonically with the proportion of women in
the salary is cut by half unless the mayor asks for a leave-of-absence for the duration of the mandate.
8the council, regardless of the gender of the mayor. However, the gap between male and
female mayors becomes dramatically large when there are no female councilors at all.
Overall, these results suggest that the gender of the mayor and the councilors plays an
important role in determining the probability of early termination of the legislature. We next
move to regression analysis to study whether these diﬀerences are robust to the inclusion of
other mayor and municipality characteristics.
4 Empirical Findings
4.1 Basic OLS Results
In Table 3 we present the results of our basic regression analysis. We include in the sample
all observations with non- missing data on the gender, age and experience of the mayor.
To maximize sample size, we keep observations with missing values on the educational level,
occupation and place of birth of the mayor, and include a dummy variable indicating missing
status for these variables. Similarly, we assign the sample mean to other variables with
missing data (municipality characteristics, fraction of seats in the mayor’s coalition, and
female share of voters), and include a dummy for missing status for these variables. These
procedures increase our sample size by about 15 percent and allow us to obtain more precise
estimates.13 We estimate the following linear model for the probability of early termination:
EarlyTjt = α + βFemalejt+ γ1Xjt + δt + ηj +  jt, (1)
where EarlyTjtis a dummy variable equal to 1 if the legislature t in municipalityj,t e r m i n a t e s
before the statutory end of the term, Female jt is equal to 1 if the mayor was a woman and
0o t h e r w i s e ,Xjt is a vector of municipality and mayor characteristics, δt is a time eﬀect, ηj
is a municipality ﬁxed eﬀect, and  jt is an idiosyncratic error term (which may also depend
13All the results are qualitatively and quantitatively robust to the exclusion of all observations with any
missing data.
9on unobserved caracteristics of the mayor elected in municipality j at time t). The last
two terms are all assumed for the moment to be orthogonal to Female jt. The parameter β
represents the eﬀect of an average elected woman, everything else equal, on the probability
of early termination. Being this a linear probability model, standard errors are made robust
to heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the municipality level. We concentrate on the
coeﬃcient on the female dummy β, and assess how it changes in size and signiﬁcance as we
include additional controls.
The ﬁrst column of Table 3 presents the coeﬃcient of the simple regression of the prob-
ability of early termination on the female dummy. The coeﬃcient indicates that female
mayors are 1.7 percentage points more likely resign before the end of the term, and it is
marginally statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level. However, the simple inclusion of
regional dummies (column 2) doubles the size of the coeﬃcient, and makes it signiﬁcant at
the 1 percent level. This simply reﬂects the fact that women are less likely to become mayors
in the more unstable municipalities in the Southern regions.
In column 3 we include other mayor characteristics, municipality, election and council
characteristics and year eﬀects as additional control variables. Most of the coeﬃcients have
the expected sign and are consistent with the patterns observed in the simple bivariate
analysis of Table 2. The probability of early resignation increases with age and decreases with
experience of the mayor, and is lower for local-born mayors. The education and occupation
dummies are each jointly insigniﬁcant, and are not reported in the table. City size increases
the probability of early termination, while income per capita and the labor force participation
rate (indicators of the economic health of the locality) lower it; however, the number of
productive units per capita (another indicator of economic activity) is positively correlated
with early termination. Predictably, city councils that are larger and have more parties are
more diﬃcult to manage, and hence experience more early terminations. Also, if the mayor’s
party controls a large number of seats in the council, the probability of early termination
decreases. This is not surprising: members of the same political party as the mayor are
10probably more closely aligned with the mayor’s preferences, and less likely to vote against
the mayor’s poposed policies. Surprisingly, though, the probability of early termination is
not correlated with the size of the mayor’s coalition. Finally, the probability of survival is
higher for left and center-left mayors, and lower for right and center-right mayors relative to
the omitted category of independents.
As we have seen from the previous tables, female mayors tend to be younger and less
experienced, and more likely to serve in economically healthy municipalities: hence it is
possible that inclusion of these variables will knock oﬀ the female coeﬃcient. This is not
the case, however: the coeﬃcients drops only very slightly, to 0.028, and remains strongly
statistically signiﬁcant.
We can also exploit the multiple elections per municipality over time to include a full
set of municipality ﬁxed eﬀects. It may be the case, in fact, that women are more likely
to be appointed in municipalities which are perceived to be structurally unstable, perhaps
because parties or voters believe they are better at reconciling diﬀerences between fractious
council members. Or it may be, instead, that they are more likely to be elected in cities
where the political environment is known to be historically untroubled, because voters do not
trust their capacity to conciliate a riotous municipal government. In all these situations, the
orthogonality assumption between Female jtand ηj would not hold anymore. In column 5 we
present the estimates including city ﬁxed eﬀects. Identiﬁcation is obtained from variation
in the gender of the mayor within a municipality across diﬀerent elections. We now ﬁnd
that the female coeﬃcient is substantially larger: once we control for all ﬁxed municipality
characteristics, females are 5.1 percentage points more likely to resign early. The increase
in the coeﬃcient relative to the speciﬁcation without ﬁxed eﬀects is consistent with the
hypothesis that women dislike competition, and are more likely to enter electoral races (and
be elected) in relatively stable municipalities where their probability of completing the term
is relatively high. Taken together, these results show that female mayors have a probability
11of early resignation that is between 17 percent and 51 percent higher relative to men.14
4.2 Gender Composition of the Council and Mayor’s Coalition
The probability that a municipal legislature survives until the end of its term depends on
the mayor’s ability to foster cooperation, and also on the individual councilors’ propensity
to cooperate with the mayor. It may therefore be of direct interest to study the eﬀect
of the gender composition of the council or of the mayor’s coalition on the probability of
early termination. Moreover, if female mayors are more likely to be surrounded by a high
proportion of female councilors, and there are gender diﬀerences in the propensity to act
cooperatively, then including the proportion of women in the council may also aﬀect the
estimated eﬀect of the mayor’s gender on the probability of early termination. It is also
worth investigating whether any eﬀect of the proportion of women in the council is driven
by coalition councilors that “stab the mayor in the back” (or refrain from doing so), or by
opposition councilors that happen to be particularly combative in their eﬀorts to oust the
mayor from oﬃce.
The analysis is carried out in Table 4. In column 1 we estimate a regression analogous
to equation (1) with the full set of control variables (see column 4 in Table 3), but we add
the proportion of females in the council, as well as the other average characteristics of the
city councilors (age, experience, level of education, proportion not employed previously, and
proportion local born). In column 2 we further separate between the proportion of women
in the mayor’s coalition and the proportion of women in opposing parties. The sample sizes
are somewhat smaller, since we only keep observations for which we observe demographic
characteristics for all city councilors (column 1), or for which we can identify with certainty
party aﬃliation (column 2).
The results show quite clearly that a higher proportion of women in the council is asso-
14In order to exclude the possibility that some women may have resigned because of maternity leave,
we run the same analysis on the sample of mayors who are more than 40 years old. Results were both
qualitatively and quantitatively invariant to this sample restriction.
12ciated with a lower probability of early termination. A 10 point increase in the percentage
of women in the council (roughly a one standard deviation increase) reduces the probability
of early termination by 0.7 percentage points, while the coeﬃcient on the female dummy
is essentially the same as that estimated in Table 3. Strikingly, the eﬀect is driven almost
entirely by women in the mayor’s coalition, while the proportion of women in other lists
has no eﬀect on the probability of early termination. However, inclusion of a full set of
municipality ﬁxed eﬀects (columns 3 and 4) makes the eﬀect of proportion women in the
council or in the mayor’s coalition become positive and insigniﬁcant. Overall, it appears that
municipalities that are inherently more stable are more likely to have women in the council
and in the mayor’s coalition.15
We defer to the next section the analysis of the interaction between the mayor’s gender
and the gender composition of the council. Before that, though, we use a regression disconti-
nuity design to explore whether the eﬀect of a female mayor is driven by a diﬀerent selection
of male and female candidates into municipalities that are more or less diﬃcult to manage.
4.3 RDD Results
The speciﬁcation we used in equation (1) ignored that the political environment might vary
from one election to another within the same municipality depending on contingent factors,
and that this might inﬂuence the choice of a female rather than a male candidate. In other
words, Female jt might be correlated with the transitory error component  jt.I f s o , ﬁ x e d
eﬀects estimates at municipality level may not be enough to remove this source of bias,
and β will no more identify the eﬀect of an average woman, everything else equal, on the
probability of early termination. To this purpose, we implement a Regression Discontinuity
15To address the potential endogeneity of the percentage of female councilors, we also ran 2SLS regres-
sions exploiting an institutional feature of the 1993 electoral reform. The 1993 law prescribed that on any
electoral list there could be no more than 60% representatives of either gender. In 1995, this provision was
unexpectedly deemed unconstitutional, and it was eliminated.
We therefore used the presence of the gender quotas as an instrument for the proportion of women in
the council. The results show that the gender quotas signiﬁcantly raised the number of women both in the
mayor’s coalition and in the council by about 6-7 percent. However, while all the ﬁrst stage diagnostics were
satisfactory, the estimates were somewhat unconvincingly large.
13Design (RDD) by focusing on mixed-gender electoral races decided by a narrow margin.16
If the outcome of an electoral race between a man and a woman is uncertain, the winner is
determined by elements which are beyond the candidates’ control (e.g., weather on election
day, breaking news), and the gender of the elected mayor is therefore exogenous with respect
to cities’ observable and unobservable characteristics.
It is important to recognize that RDD comes with high internal validity, but low external
validity. Without strong assumptions justifying extrapolation to other subpopulations (e.g.,
homogeneity of the treatment eﬀect), the RDD never allows to estimate the eﬀect of the
treatment for values of the running variable that are far from the threshold. We discuss be-
low the conditions under which the RDD estimate can correctly identify the average gender
diﬀerence in the probability of early termination. We should also mention, however, that in
our study local identiﬁcation may actually be of ﬁrst-order relevance, as it may be intrinsi-
cally important to understand the role of the mayor’s characteristics speciﬁcally when the
majority detained by the mayor in the council is small, and hence cooperation within the
council matters the most.
4.3.1 Identiﬁcation
In the spirit of Rubin (1974), we deﬁne EarlyTj(1) as the potential outcome of municipality
j if the mayor is a woman, and EarlyTj(0) as the potential outcome of the same municipality
if the mayor is a man, at a speciﬁc point in time t. Our identiﬁcation strategy relies on the
fact that in mixed-gender races there is a man running against a woman, with voters deciding
whether a municipality will have a female or a male mayor.17 Assignment to treatment can
16See Imbens and Lemieux (2008) and Van der Klaauw (2008) for a survey on RDD. See also Lee, Moretti
and Butler (2004) and Lee (2008) for empirical studies that have exploited the assignment mechanism
generated by the margin of victory in single-member plurality elections. Closer to our spirit, Rehavi (2007)
and Clots-Figueras (2008) use the share of districts won by a female candidate in a close election against a
male politician, to identify the eﬀect of female representatives on educational and other policies, respectively
in the U.S. and in India.
17For the sake of the simplicity, we assume for the moment that there are no other candidates. We also
do not consider the case in which there is more than one gender-mixed race within the same municipality
over time t, or with the same mayor i.
14then be speciﬁed as:
Female j =1 [ MVj ≥ 0], (2)
where MVj is the margin of victory and 1[.] the indicator function. The margin of victory
is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the vote share of the female and the male candidate.
This is an example of sharp RDD, as the probability of receiving the treatment has a sharp
discontinuity equal to 1 at the threshold MVj =0 .
The margin MVj can be seen as a random variable depending on observable and unob-
servable city characteristics, as well as on general occurrences on election day. Deﬁne Uj
as a term representing the municipality unobservable characteristics aﬀecting EarlyTj(1),
EarlyTj(0), MVj, and the observed municipality characteristics Xj at the same time, where
Xj also includes the policy that will be implemented by the candidate if elected. The rela-
tionship between Uj and MVj is assumed to satisfy the following condition.
Assumption 1 Deﬁne F(MVj|Uj = u) as the cumulative distribution function of MVj
conditional on Uj and, for each u in the support of Uj, assume that:
a. 0 <F(0|Uj = u) < 1;
b. F(MVj|Uj = u) is continuously diﬀerentiable in MVj at MVj =0 .
Assumption (1) states that even if candidates can partially aﬀect the electoral outcome
(i.e., there might be some partial manipulation of the running variable), their margin of
victory includes some random element, so that the probability of a woman or a man winning
the election is never equal to 0 or 1 (condition a). Furthermore, when MVj = 0 voters
are indiﬀerent between the two candidates, and each candidate has the same probability of
winning or losing by a narrow margin (condition b).
Lee (2008) shows that under Assumption (1):
lim
 ↑0
E(Uj|MVj =  ) = lim
 ↓0
E(Uj|MVj =  )( 3 )
15lim
 ↑0
E(Xj|MVj =  ) = lim
 ↓0
E(Xj|MVj =  ). (4)
that is, when MVj = 0 cities’ observable and the unobservable characteristics are identical,
independently on whether the elected candidate is a man or a woman (in the next subsection
we discuss how candidates’ characteristics behave around the threshold). It follows that:
lim
 ↑0
E(EarlyTj(0)|Female j =0 ,MV j =  ) = lim
 ↑0
E(EarlyTj|MVj =  )( 5 )
lim
 ↓0
E(EarlyTj(1)|Female j =1 ,MV j =  ) = lim
 ↓0
E(EarlyTj|MVj =  ). (6)
Therefore, the quantity [lim ↓0 E(EarlyTj|MVj =  ) − lim ↑0 E(EarlyTj|MVj =  )] has the
causal interpretation of the average treatment eﬀect at the threshold:
ATErdd ≡ E(EarlyTj(1) − EarlyTj(0)|MVj =0 ) . (7)
4.3.2 Interpretation
The main reason for implementing a regression discontinuity design is that it allows us to
control for any potential correlation between time-varying unobservable characteristics at the
municipality level and the gender of the mayor. This is probably the type of selection that
is of ﬁrst-order importance, and the RD design is helpful in taking account of it. However,
as is clear from equation (7), the RRD can only identify the local treatment eﬀect of the
mayor’s gender in races decided by a narrow margin. To understand whether this parameter
is informative about the average gender diﬀerence in the population, we need to consider the
underlying voting process that determines whether an electoral race will be closely contested.
In interpreting our results, we build on the model of partisan politicians (Alesina, 1988).
In this model, political parties care not only about being elected, but also about the policy
they will implement if they win the election. Rational voters anticipate that parties cannot
credibly commit to any announced policy other than their preferred one, and will have an
incentive to deviate towards their preferred policy after the election. Hence, the only time-
16consistent equilibriumis the one in which the two parties follow their most preferred policies,
and there is no convergence in policies towards the median voter. We introduce here the
possibility that the elected mayor will not be able to implement the desired policy and will
be ousted from power before the end of the term.
Consider ﬁrst as a benchmark the case in which voters care only about the announced
policies, but do not care about the probability that the policy will be implemented.18 The
share of votes going to any one party is simply a function of the preferred policies (which
are assumed to be exogenous) and of the distribution of preferences in the population.19 We
make the natural assumption that the more closely contested the electoral race, the less likely
is the government to survive until the end of the term (because the majority in the council
will be narrower). If women are less likely to enter closely contested races, then the OLS
estimate over the whole sample of races will underestimate the average gender diﬀerence in
the probability of survival. However, if the type of race in which women enter is unrelated to
the characteristic of the candidate (i.e., high ability women are just as likely to enter closely
contested races as non closely contested races), the RDD estimate will provide an unbiased
estimate of the average gender diﬀerence in the population.
More plausibly, there might be selection in the type of races entered by candidates with
diﬀerent abilities, both observed (experience, age, education) and unobserved (charisma,
personality, ability to foster cooperation). If high ability candidates of both genders are more
likely to enter closely-contested races, then the RDD estimate will capture the diﬀerence in
the probabilityof survival between high abilitymenand high abilitywomen. The relationship
between this parameter and the average gender diﬀerence will depend on what we are willing
to assume about the eﬀect of “ability” on the probability of survival for the two genders. If
18Alternatively, it may be the case that voters have no information about the candidates’ ability to realize
the policy, and there is no way to credibly signal one’s ability.
19More recent “citizen-candidate” models (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996; Besley and Coate, 1997; Chat-
tophadyay and Duﬂo, 2004) endogenize the candidates’ policy platforms. These models have the feature
that in a two-candidate equilibrium, the two candidates will exactly split the vote. This is unappealing for
our analysis, because it implies that all races should be “closely contested,” while our focus is precisely on
the contrast between closely and non-closely contested races.
17ability matters more for women than for men (e.g., it requires women with a “tough skin” to
survive in a male-dominated environment), then the RDD estimate will be an underestimate
of the average gender diﬀerence in the probability of survival. Similarly, if the pattern of
selection by ability in close races diﬀers by gender, with women running in close races being
more selected in terms of ability, the RDD estimate would also be an underestimate of the
average gender diﬀerence.
Consider now the case where voters care not only about policies, but also about the
politicians’ ability to successfully implement them. Moreover, voters know that women may
be less likely to survive until the end of the term. Then, in close electoral races female
candidates must compensate for this disability, i.e., they must be either (a) perceived to
be more stable in terms of other observed characteristics (age, experience, etc.) and unob-
served characteristics (charisma, personality, etc.); or (b) closer to the “median voter” in
terms of their preferred policy than their male opponent.20 The ﬁrst case has some testable
implications: ﬁrst, we should observe divergence in candidates’ observable characteristics as
the race becomes close, with female candidates being superior in terms of characteristics
that are positively correlated with stability; second, we should observe ex-post no diﬀerence
in government stability, because voters have compensated the lower perceived stability of
the female candidate with other characteristics that make her more stable. If some ex-post
diﬀerence in government stability is detected, this will be an underestimate of the average
gender diﬀerence in the population.
On the other hand, it is diﬃcult to assess whether female candidates in close races choose
policies that are closer to those of the median voter (i.e., they choose policies such that, if
there were no diﬀerences in perceived stability, they would garner a comfortable majority of
the votes). However, if being closer to the median voter has no eﬀect on the ex-post survival
probability, the same reasoning used in the case of indiﬀerent or uninformed voters applies
also here: what the RDD estimate can capture depends on the selection of women and men
20By “median voter” we refer to the median voter in a race in which the candidates do not diﬀer in terms
of perceived stability.
18into diﬀerent types of electoral races. If instead the fact of being closer to the median voter
increases government stability, the RDD estimate would be again an underestimate of the
average gender diﬀerence in the population.
To sum up, the RDD delivers an estimate of β which is free of any bias related to
both time-varying and time-invariant speciﬁcities of the cities in which women are elected.
RDD estimates can potentially identify the average gender diﬀerence in the population, but
this will depend on the assumptions about the selection of candidates by gender into close
electoral races, and on the voters’ informational set.21 Under most plausible assumptions
about the type of selection of candidates into close races, it is likely that the RDD coeﬃcient
represents an underestimate of the average gender diﬀerence in the population.
4.3.3 Estimation
Various estimation methods have been proposed to implement equation (7), which requires
estimating the boundary points of two regression functions. In particular, we apply two
methods: the local linear regression (LLR) proposed by Imbens and Lemieux (2008), and
the split polynomial approximation used by Lee, Moretti, and Butler (2004) and Lee (2008).
The ﬁrst method restricts the estimation to a compact support, and ﬁts two separate
linear regression functions within a distance h on either side of the threshold. This method is
particularly attractive because it is not sensitive to outcome values for observations far away
from the threshold. In other words, it restricts the sample to an interval MVj ∈ [−h,+h]t o
estimate the model:
EarlyTj = α + βFemalej + γMVj + δFemalej · MVj +  j, (8)
using OLS. The bandwidth h can be selected applying the cross-validation method proposed
by Imbens and Lemieux (2008).
21The same is true for other empirical designs, like the experimental framework implemented in Chat-
topadhyay and Duﬂo (2004), where randomly chosen cities were assigned a female mayor but there was no
control over candidates’s selection.
19The second method uses the whole sample, choosing a ﬂexible speciﬁcation to ﬁt the
relationship between EarlyTj and MVj on either side of the threshold:
EarlyTj = α + βFemalej +( γ1MVj + ...+ γpMV
p
j )+
(δ1Female j · MVj + ... + δpFemale jMV
p
j )+ j, (9)
which is then estimated with OLS. As MVj is equal to zero at the threshold, the coeﬃcient
β identiﬁes the ATErdd.
4.3.4 Results
The sample of mixed-gender electoral races is made of 2,255 electoral terms, 1,237 of which
elected with a margin of victory smaller than 10 percentage points, 665 smaller than 5, and
144 smaller than 1. The sample is similar to the sample of all races in many respects (the
average population is 8,369, 22 percent of cities are in the South, and the average income per
capita is 13,954), including the average probability of early termination which is 10 percent.22
We start with a graphical representation in Figure 1, which reports the running-mean
smoothing (separately on either side of the threshold) of the probability of early termination.
To account for the presence of other rivals in the electoral race, MVj is divided by the sum
of the share of the ﬁrst two candidates in the decisive ballot.23 Male mayors have values
of MVj below 0, while female mayors above 0. The jump is clearly visible and positive,
meaning that in the neighborhood of the threshold municipalities with a female mayor are
more unstable. It is also worth noting that the higher the distance from the threshold, the
lower the probability of early termination, which is consistent with the idea that a signiﬁcant
majority of seats in the city council guarantees more stable governments.
More formal RDD estimates on the probability of early termination are reported in Table
22We excluded the uncontested races, and the races with the ﬁrst two candidates of the same gender.
23Over the sample of contested mixed-gender electoral races, 48.45 percent had two candidates only, 29.43
had three (the ﬁrst two being a man and a woman), 12.21 had four, and 9.91 percent more than four. In
case the election is decided at the second ballot, the number of candidates is by deﬁnition equal to two.
205. To begin with, the ﬁrst row presents OLS estimates of the probability of early termination
on the sample of mixed-gender races. Compared to the sample of all races, mixed-gender
races do not deliver substantially diﬀerent regression results, the eﬀect of a female mayor
on the probability of early termination being positive (0.036) and statistically signiﬁcant.
Numbers almost double when we run a separate estimation on both sides of the discontinuity
point. When using a local linear regression on the whole sample of mixed-gender races, the
eﬀect of having a female mayor on the probability of early termination is 0.065, which rises
to 0.076 when the electoral race is made of two candidates only. When we use instead a
local linear regression speciﬁcation with an optimal bandwidth of 25 percentage points, the
coeﬃcient for a female mayor is 0.061, while with a second order polynomial approximation it
is 0.060.24 Results are not sensitive to the choice of the bandwidth (the local linear regression
estimate with half optimal bandwidth is 0.063), as well as to the use of mixed-gender races
with two candidates only (and an optimal bandwidth of 29 percentage points).
Taken together, these results show that municipalities headed by female mayors have a
probability of early resignation that is between 60 percent and 80 percent higher relative
to men. These numbers are signiﬁcantly higher than the regression results over the entire
sample in Table 3 and 6. In particular, they are higher than the regression results over
the sample of mixed-gender races, which may be interpreted as evidence that either female
candidates sort into electoral races that are not closely contested (i.e., more stable), or that
they face more diﬃculties at governing when there is a narrow majority.
The validity of our estimation strategy can be assessed with diﬀerent testing procedures.
In Figure 2 we ﬁrst investigate the validity of assumption 1 about the continuity of the
running variable. Even though male candidates seem to have an electoral advantage when
running against a woman, a visual inspection of MVj at the discontinuity point rejects
the hypothesis that there might be complete manipulation of the running variable. The
density is in fact smooth and well behaved (up to some small sample noise) around the
24Results are qualitatively similar when using higher order polynomials.
21threshold, with male and female candidates sharing the same probability of winning when
the electoral race is tight. A formal density test (McCrary, 2008) further rejects the presence
of a statistically signiﬁcant jump in the running variable at the discontinuity point (the
estimated log-diﬀerence is -0.090, with a standard error of 0.090).25
In Table 6 we analyze the behavior of the available pre-treatment covariates in the neigh-
borhood of the threshold. As we can see, all the municipality characteristics are well bal-
anced, as well as the political environment characteristics (mayor’s party, gender of the
voters).26 As a matter of fact, Figures 3 and 4 show that as the electoral race becomes tight
there is equalization between municipalities where men and women are elected, which is not
the case for less contested races. This is compelling evidence in support of the randomization
induced by tight electoral competitions.27 We ﬁnd instead some diﬀerences between male
and female winning candidates: women elected in close races are younger, more educated,
less experienced and more likely to be not employed than their male counterpart.28 We also
compute an index of “perceived instability” by predicting the ex-post survival probability
using all the observable characteristics available to the voters (the same as in Table 6). We
do not ﬁnd any diﬀerence in this index around the threshold: although elected women and
men are not observationally equivalent, voters do not perceive them as diﬀerent in terms of
ex-post stability. It is also worth noting that there is no evidence of divergence in candidates’
observable characteristics as far as the race becomes close (see Figure 5): instead, women
elected with a small margin are older, less likely to be not employed, and less likely to be
born in a diﬀerent province than their average.
25The optimal bin size and bandwidth for the sample of all the mixed-gender races were 0.583 and 16.043
respectively. Figures are identical for the sample of races with only two candidates.
26In principle, the old-age index, the per-capita income and the labor force participation rate refer to 2005,
and could not be considered as pre-treatment. However, as far as there is some degree of resilience, they
cannot be easily aﬀected by the mayor and we can consider them as a permanent city characteristic.
27We also implemented placebo tests by estimating jumps at points of the running variable where there
should be no eﬀect (the median of the two subsamples on either side of the cutoﬀ value), and found that
jumps at fake thresholds are never statistically diﬀerent from zero. Finally, we run a falsiﬁcation test by
using the pre-treatment outcome of the municipality, i.e., whether the previous legislature terminated early
despite it was not headed by a female mayor, and found that in the pre-treatment period the municipalities
which will later have a female mayor did not behave diﬀerently.
28We ﬁnd very similar ﬁgures when comparing losing and winning candidates.
22Following the discussion in section 4.3.2, we can interpret this evidence in two ways:
either voters do not anticipate that women will be more likely to resign after election; or,
alternatively, even if they know a diﬀerence exists, this is compensated in other dimensions
of candidates’ policy platform, rather than of candidates’ characteristics. In both cases,
the RDD estimate represents at least an underestimate of the average gender diﬀerence in
the population, the true diﬀerence being even larger. Furthermore, the fact that the RDD
point estimates in Table 5 are invariant to the inclusion of all covariates (including mayors’
characteristics) is further evidence of the robustness of the estimation strategy.
5 Interpretation of the Results
The analysis up to this point has shown fairly robust evidence that female mayors are
more likely to be forced into early resignation. We now consider a number of possible
explanations for this result. For simplicity, we conduct all our analysis using OLS and ﬁxed
eﬀects regressions. To gain in sample size, we will also focus on the gender composition of
the council rather than the mayor’s coalition.29
Discrimination by male councilors. A natural hypothesis is that female mayors face
more diﬃculties in keeping their coalition together, because of resistance on the part of male
councilors, who dislike being led by a woman. This is consistent with the notion of employee
discrimination ` a la Becker (1971).30 We conduct two tests to assess to what extent our
results can be driven by the unfavorable attitudes of male councilors toward fenale leaders.
First, we look at whether the eﬀect of a female mayor is larger when there is a relatively
larger share of men in the council. The results are presented in Table 7. The ﬁrst column
is a simple OLS regression similar to the speciﬁcation in Table 4, where we add a linear
29All the following results are qualitatively unchanged if we use the proportion of women in the mayor’s
coalition (see also Table 4).
30While employee discrimination features prominently in every textbook discussion of discrimination, there
has been surprisingly little empirical research on the subject. Exceptions include Ragan and Tremblay (1988)
and Buﬀum and Whaples, (1995).
23interaction between the mayor gender dummy and the proportion of women in the council.31
The coeﬃcienton the interaction is negative, consistent with the hypothesis of discrimination
on the part of male councilors, but not statistically signiﬁcant. Compared to the results in
Table 4, the coeﬃcient on the main eﬀect of gender rises to 0.048. This is the implied eﬀect
of a female mayor at the head of an entirely male council. Evaluated at the mean of the
proportion female in the council, the eﬀect of a female mayor on the probability of early
termination is 3.1 percentage points, and statistically signiﬁcant. Column 2 includes a full
set of municipality ﬁxed eﬀects. The interaction eﬀect becomes larger but not statistically
signiﬁcant, while the main eﬀect and the implied eﬀect at the mean of proportion female in
the council rises and remains signiﬁcant.
In columns 3 and 4 we include the proportion female in the council as a piecewise constant
function, and we interact this function with the gender dummy. We ﬁnd now an even
larger eﬀect of a female mayor in entirely male council, both in the OLS and the ﬁxed
eﬀects speciﬁcation. The remaining coeﬃcients are all negative and almost all statistically
signiﬁcant (except in the speciﬁcation with ﬁxed eﬀects), but do not reveal a clear pattern
of the female mayor eﬀect becoming smaller as the proportion of women in the council
increases. In columns 5 and 6 we include just a dummy for whether there were any women
in the council. The main eﬀect of gender is essentially the same as in column 3 and 4: in
entirely male coalitions, female mayors are between 13.4 and 15.1 percentage points more
likely to resign early. If there is at least one woman in the coalition, the eﬀect of a female
mayor on the probability of early termination drops to between 2.4-5.5 percentage points.
Summing up, a female mayor heading a male-only council has a much lower probability
of survival than her male counterpart. This result suggests that male councilors may act less
cooperatively when the government is headed by a female, and that this element is enhanced
when the council is made up entirely of men. We can view this result as a “political glass
31Table 4 highlighted that it is primarily the proportion of women in the mayor’s coalition (and not in
other lists) that is correlated with the probability of early termination. To preserve sample size, we look here
at the interaction between the proportion of women in the council and the mayor’s gender. All the results
in Table 7 are essentially the same if we use proportion women in the mayor’s coalition instead.
24ceiling,” so to speak: women may struggle to reach the upper echelons of management or
the political arena, because they encounter resistance and lack of cooperativeness from the
(predominantly male) group that they are supposed to lead.32 Interestingly, we do not ﬁnd
that any additional increases in the proportion of female councilors (beyond having at least
one female councilor) raises the survival probability of female-headed councils. The extent
of discrimination does not increase linearly with the fraction of male councilors. Rather,
it appears that there may be a latent resistance of men to be led by a woman, which only
manifests itself when there is not at least one female councilor that can keep it in check.
Our second test for the presence of discrimination involves comparing the eﬀect of a
female mayor across diﬀerent Italian regions, and exploiting the large geographical diﬀerences
in attitudes towards women. The ﬁrst two columns of Table 8 show that the eﬀect of a female
mayor is concentrated almost exclusivelyin the Southern regions (as compared to the regions
in the Center), where traditional gender norms prevail. At the same time, municipalities in
the South may be more diﬃcult to manage for reasons that are unrelated to gender norms
(organized crime, low tax revenues, worse infrastructure).
To focus our attention on gender norms, we collected data from the 1999 wave of the Eu-
ropean Values Survey (EVS), and constructed for each region an index of favorable attitudes
towards working women.33 The index is normalized to have mean 0 and standard deviation
1 in the sample of the 20 Italian regions. Columns 3 and 4 show that the interaction between
the female mayor dummy and this index is negative and signiﬁcant in the OLS speciﬁca-
tion, and of roughly similar magnitude but statistically not signiﬁcant in the ﬁxed eﬀects
speciﬁcation. In columns 5 and 6 we replace the index with the actual female labor force
32Gender stigmas, but of the opposite sign, are also documented by Bagues and Esteve-Volart (2007), who
ﬁnd that female candidates to the Corps of the Spanish Judiciary are signiﬁcantly less likely to be hired
when randomly assigned to a committee where the share of female evaluators is relatively large.
33The index was constructed by taking the ﬁrst principal component of male respondents’ answers (on a
four point scale) to the following six questions: a) A mother who works outside of the home can establish
a warm and safe relationship with her children as much as a mother who does not work; b) It’s likely that
a pre-school child suﬀers if the mother works outside the home; c) It is OK to work outside the home, but
what the majority of women really want is a home and children; d) Being a housewife is as fulﬁlling for a
woman as working for pay; e) Having a job is the best way for a woman to be independent; f) Both the
husband and the wife should contribute to family earnings.
25participation rate in the year the municipal council was elected, computed using the Bank of
Italy’s Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW). This allows to dispel concerns that
the index is only capturing some regional eﬀects that are constant over time and correlated
with the probability of early termination. The interaction of the gender dummy and female
labor force participation is negative and marginally statistically signiﬁcant in column 5 (not
in column 6, when we include municipality ﬁxed eﬀects), indicating that even within regions
a higher proportion of working women makes the eﬀect of a female mayor become smaller.
Overall, while the evidence in Tables 9 and 10 cannot be viewed as conclusive, it does
suggest that part of the lower survival probability of female mayors can be attributed to
discriminating attitudes on the part of male councilors who resist being led by a woman.
Diﬀerences in combativeness. An alternative hypothesis, inspired by the notion that
women dislike competition and may choose to opt out of very competitive settings, holds
that women may be less combative, and may choose to resign early when encountering
diﬃculties in handling a riotous municipal council. It may also be possible that this eﬀect is
more pronounced in councils in which the mayor is the only woman or in regions with more
traditional gender roles, consistent with the ﬁndings of Tables 9 and 10.
This hypothesis implies that type of early resignation should be aﬀected by the gender of
the mayor. Speciﬁcally, female mayors should be more likely to actively resign, while there
may be no gender diﬀerences in the proability of early termination because of a no-conﬁdence
vote or because of resignation of the council. We test this hypothesis in Table 9. In the ﬁrst
2 columns the dependent variable is a dummy for whether the mayor actively resigns, and in
the next two columns the dependent variable is a dummy for whether early termination of the
council was forced by the council’s resignation or by a no-conﬁdence vote. The hypothesized
gender diﬀerence in combativeness does not receive any support in the data: both in the
whole sample (top panel), and in the South only (bottom panel), we ﬁnd that female-headed
councils are more likely to be terminated because of the council’s resignation rather than
because of the mayor’s resignation. These results are conﬁrmed in the multinomial logit
26speciﬁcation of columns 5 and 6. The fact that early termination apparently originates in
the council, and that the eﬀect is stronger in Southern regions, reinforces the idea that
discrimination plays an important role.
Women as reformers. Perhaps women mayors have more diﬃculties in surviving until
the end of their term not because of gender per se, but because women are more likely to be
reformers, and face more obstacles in trying to implement their reforms. We do not view this
hypothesis as particularly credible. First, in all of our regressions we control for an extensive
set of background characteristics, including the age and previous experience of the mayor in
municipal government. These variables capture to some extent the likelihood that the mayor
is a “new face” in municipal politics. The basic result is very robust to the inclusion of all
these controls. In fact, when we restrict the sample to only young or inexperienced mayors,
we still ﬁnd a large and signiﬁcant gender coeﬃcient.
We can also probe further the “women as reformers” hypothesis by directly examining
the policies enacted in each municipality. We have information on a limited, but important,
set of policy instruments, namely the size of the budget deﬁcit, revenues per capita, and the
share of government expenditures on education, welfare and security.34 C o l u m n s1t o6o f
Table 10 show the results from regressing these policy variables on the female dummy and
on the full set of control variables used in our base speciﬁcation. We ﬁnd that the gender of
the mayor has essentially no eﬀect on either the budget deﬁcit or on log revenue per capita.
There is some small positive eﬀect on the expenditure for education in the entire sample (see
also Chattopadhyay and Duﬂo, 2004; Clots-Figueras, 2008a and 2008b; Funk and Gathman,
2008; Rehavi, 2007), but not if we limit attention to Southern regions.
In Table 11 we present the results from the estimation of the basic model with controls
for the policy variables. Predictably, given the results in Table 10, the gender dummy
coeﬃcient is unaﬀected by the inclusion of the policy variables. Some of the policy variables
34The percentage budget deﬁcit is computed as the absolute deﬁcit divided by the total revenues. Welfare
expenditure also includes the expenditure for transportation, since until 1999 the two items were classiﬁed
together. All budget variables computed as the mean over the term, excluding election years.
27are statistically signiﬁcant and have the expected signs: higher revenues and higher budget
deﬁcits lower the probability of early termination, suggesting that the legislature is more
stable when there is more money to go around, and when ﬁscal policy is more lax, suggesting
that the mayor can secure the support of council members by spending more proﬂigately.
Education expenditure is associated with lower chances of early termination, while police
expenditure increases it (perhaps police expenditure serves as a proxy for the incidence of
organized crime), but these eﬀects disappear when we include municipality ﬁxed eﬀects.
Overall, there does not seem to be much evidence that gender diﬀerences in the probability
of early termination are due to diﬀerences in the policies enacted by male and female mayors.
Other explanations. Other explanations for the gender diﬀerences are more diﬃcult
to confute with the data at hand. One possibility is that female mayors are more diﬃcult
at fostering cooperation in general, and not speciﬁcally when the coalition is predominantly
male. This appears to be inconsistent with the large eﬀect of a female mayor in entirely
male coalitions, and with the large eﬀect in regions with more conservative attitudes towards
working women. It is true that a female mayor is more likely to resign even if there is at
least one woman in the coalition (Table 7, columns 5 and 6), but one should keep in mind
that on average less than a ﬁfth of council members are women: in general, female mayors
operate in an environment where men represent a substantial majority.
It could also be that female mayors are in fact less eﬀective in running the municipal
government, and that this diﬀerence in government “productivity” is the reason for the gap
in the probability of early termination. While this explanation is at odds with the lack of
gender diﬀerences in enacted policies, these are clearly imperfect measures of government
output. One possible measure of the success of a city is population growth (Glaeser et
al., 1995). However, in contrast to the hypothesis of female mayors being less productive,
we actually ﬁnd that population growth is higher in cities headed by a female mayor (2.21
percent overall, 0.76 percent annualized growth rate) rather than a male mayor (1.63 percent
overall, 0.43 percent annualized), even though this diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant.
28One result that emerged from Table 2 is that the gender diﬀerence in the probability of
early termination vanishes among more experienced mayors. This result persists even when
we control for all the other mayor and municipality characteristics. This can lead one to
think that women view their experience in politics as an exploration of a new career path,
and those who ﬁnd out that they are a bad match leave early to pursue other aspirations,
while those who remain in municipal government are equally eﬀective as men. We view this
explanation as complementary to our preferred story based on gender dynamics within the
city council. It is possible that inexperienced female leaders are more susceptible to hostility
on the part of male councilors, and this leads them to be more likely to resign early. We
should also note that, even holding constant previous experience in municipal government,
the eﬀect of a female mayor is larger in the South and in municipalities with no female
councilors, lending support to a story based on discrimination within the council.
Finally, the female mayor eﬀect may be the result of expected discrimination on the
part of voters, rather than something related to the group dynamics within the council.
According to this hypothesis, coalition members who expect that a woman candidate will be
discriminated against in the upcoming elections operate to remove her from oﬃce in order to
improve their electoral chances. We don’t view this explanation as very plausible. First, a
woman mayor had been elected in the ﬁrst place, so it is diﬃcult to argue that discrimination
will only manifest itself in subsequent elections. In fact, Beaman et al. (2008) argue that
exposure to female political leaders improves perceptions of female leader eﬀectiveness and
weakens stereotypes about gender roles in public and domestic spheres. Second, we have
shown that female mayors implementpolicies that are essentially no diﬀerent from their male
counterparts, so it is unlikely that voters will lobby to remove a female mayor but not a male
one. Lastly, we did not ﬁnd any evidence that female mayors suﬀer any electoral penalty
(relative to men) after having been forced to resign, even though the sample size may be too
small to detect meaningful diﬀerences.
296C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we present one of the ﬁrst pieces of evidence on the eﬀect of politicians’ gender
on government stability. Using a large sample of Italian municipalities, we show that the
probability of early termination of a city council increases when the mayor is a woman.
The result is robust to the inclusion of a large set of controls and municipality ﬁxed eﬀects,
and to a regression discontinuity analysis that controls for the potential selection of women
candidates into diﬀerent types of electoral races. In fact the latter analysis shows that
the gender gap in the probability of early termination is even higher in mixed-gender races
decided by a narrow margin. This suggests that women are less likely to run for oﬃce in
municipalities that are relatively diﬃcult to manage.
We discuss a number of potential explanations for these ﬁndings. The fact that the
“female mayor eﬀect” is more pronounced when the mayor heads an entirely male coalition,
and is concentrated in regions with less favorable attitudes towards working women suggests
that part of eﬀect can be attributed to discriminating attitudes on the part of male councilors
who resist being led by a woman. Other explanations receive less support in the data.
These results could be used to understand gender dynamics in other hierarchical environ-
ments with which the municipal political arena (more even than the national arena) shares
many features. For example, in corporate ﬁrms the CEO is elected by shareholders and is
appointed to run the company for a limited term together with a board of directors, which
resembles a municipal council in both size and dynamics.
Of course, our empirical exercise cannot say anything about whether the gender dif-
ferences we observe are the result of individual’s innate qualities (nature) or of personal
experiences (nurture).35 Still, it raises a challenge for empirical research aimed at assessing
the existence of gender diﬀerences over a broader array of dimensions.
35See Gneezy, Leonard and List (2008) for an exercise which uses experimental evidence to provide insights
about the determinants of the observed gender diﬀerences.
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relative % votes female candidate
winning man winning woman
observed values
Note: The solid line is a running-mean smoothing (least squares), separate on
either side of the threshold.
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−40 −20 0 20 40
relative % votes female
winning man winning woman
observed values
Note: The solid line is a running-mean smoothing (least squares), separate on
either side of the threshold. population is the resident population at election.
old-age index deﬁned as 100 times the ratio of population above age 65 over
population below age 14, as of 2005. active population deﬁned as the ratio of the
active population (15-64) over the whole population, as of 2005. income pc is the
gross per capita income, as of 2005.
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relative % votes female
winning man winning woman
observed values
Note: The solid line is a running-mean smoothing (least squares), separate on
either side of the threshold. center-right and center-left is the party to which the
mayor belongs.
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relative % votes female
winning man winning woman
observed values
Note: The solid line is a running-mean smoothing (least squares), separate on
either side of the threshold. local born i s1i ft h em a y o ri sb o r ni nt h es a m e
province. terms in oﬃce as mayor only. perceived instability computed predicting
the ex-post survival probability using all the observable characteristics available
to the voters.
38Male Female
Std. error of 
difference
Individual:
Age 47.019 44.256 -2.763 *** 0.275
Term limit binding 0.256 0.195 -0.061 *** 0.013
Terms in office 1.618 1.330 -0.288 *** 0.023
Years of experience 6.451 4.398 -2.053 *** 0.141
Local born 0.865 0.785 -0.079 *** 0.010
Education: primary 0.033 0.014 -0.018 *** 0.005
Education: lower secondary 0.123 0.081 -0.041 *** 0.010
Education: upper secondary 0.437 0.424 -0.013 0.015
Education: college 0.408 0.481 0.073 *** 0.015
Previous occup.: not employed 0.117 0.207 0.090 *** 0.010
Municipality:
Population 7,771 7,866 95 1,346
South 0.249 0.143 -0.106 *** 0.012
Prop. population in labor force (in 2005) 0.407 0.419 0.012 *** 0.002
Firms per capita (in 2005) 0.077 0.079 0.002 *** 0.001
Old-age index (in 2005) 1.864 1.901 0.038 0.045
Income per capita (in 2005, euros) 13,388 14,122 709 *** 91.738
Prop. female voters 0.511 0.512 0.001 ** 0.000
Right and center-right party 0.075 0.062 -0.013 * 0.008
Left and center-left party 0.651 0.715 0.064 *** 0.014
Council:
Total seats in council 15.039 15.014 -0.025 0.144
Average age in council 40.944 41.258 0.314 *** 0.117
Average experience in council 2.588 2.422 -0.167 *** 0.046
Prop. college in council 0.198 0.203 0.005 0.004
Prop. female in council 0.177 0.188 0.011 *** 0.003
Mayor's coalition:
Prop. seats in mayor's coalition 0.697 0.690 -0.007 *** 0.003
Average age in mayor's coalition 40.516 40.628 0.113 0.129
Average experience in mayor's coalition 2.420 2.224 -0.196 *** 0.052
Prop. college in mayor's coalition 0.180 0.186 0.006 0.005
Prop. female in mayor's coalition 0.192 0.203 0.011 *** 0.004
Observations 17,626 1,256
Table 1: Mayor Characteristics by Gender
Difference
Note: Population is the resident population at election. Old-age index is the ratio of population above 65 over population
below 14. Prop. population in labor force is the ratio of active population (15-64) over the whole population. Income per
capita is the disposable income after taxes. Terms in office as mayor, including the current one. Years of experience in a
municipal elective office. Local born is 1 if the mayor is born in the same province. Party is the party to which the mayor
belongs.Male Female All
Incumbency status
First term 0.119 0.138 0.120
Second term or more 0.074 0.060 0.074
Term limit binding 0.086 0.071 0.086
Experience
Less than 5 years 0.121 0.136 0.123
More than 5 years 0.076 0.072 0.076
Region
North-West 0.050 0.061 0.051
North-East 0.070 0.084 0.071
Center 0.089 0.106 0.090
South 0.191 0.327 0.196
Islands 0.127 0.157 0.129
Population
Less than 5,000 0.069 0.080 0.069
More than 5,000 0.178 0.192 0.179
Income per capita
Below median 0.130 0.175 0.132
Above median 0.070 0.081 0.070
Number of parties in council
One 0.076 0.091 0.077
Two 0.078 0.092 0.079
Three 0.091 0.112 0.093
Four 0.095 0.088 0.094
Five or more 0.188 0.232 0.190
Political affiliation
Right and center-right 0.100 0.117 0.101
Separatists and regionals 0.166 0.429 0.181
Center 0.085 0.094 0.086
Left and center-left 0.085 0.105 0.086
Others 0.123 0.133 0.123
Prop. female in council
0% 0.169 0.275 0.174
0-10 % 0.141 0.155 0.142
10-20% 0.100 0.122 0.101
20-30% 0.070 0.063 0.069
> 30% 0.054 0.085 0.056
All 0.100 0.117 0.101
Observations 17,626 1,256
Table 2: Mean of Dependent Variable: 1 if Early Termination
Note: Population is the resident population at election. Experience in a municipal elective office. Local born is
1 if the mayor is born in the same province. Income per capita is the disposable income after taxes, as of 2005.
Political affiliation  is the party to which the mayor belongs.(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female 0.017* 0.032*** 0.028*** 0.051***




Local born -0.017*** -0.009
[0.006] [0.012]
Term limit binding -0.001 0.038***
[0.007] [0.013]
Terms in office -0.001 -0.013
[0.004] [0.008]
Years of experience -0.004*** -0.003***
[0.001] [0.001]
Selected municipality characteristics
Log population 0.019*** 0.035
[0.003] [0.027]
Log income per capita (in 2005, euros) -0.097***
[0.017]
Old-age index (in 2005) -0.006***
[0.001]
Prop. population in labor force (in 2005) -0.381***
[0.060]
Firms per capita (in 2005) 0.304***
[0.110]
Selected election and council characteristics
Total seats in council 0.005*** -0.017*
[0.001] [0.010]
Prop. seats in mayor's party 0.017 0.047
[0.022] [0.032]
Prop. seats in mayor's coalition -0.011 0.000
[0.007] [0.010]
Number parties in mayor's coalition 0.013*** 0.010*
[0.004] [0.006]
Prop. female voters -0.079 0.750**
[0.126] [0.373]
Political affiliation (omitted category: no political affiliation)
Right and center-right 0.029** 0.011
[0.012] [0.017]




Left and center-left -0.017** -0.023**
[0.007] [0.011]
Macro-region dummies (4) 333
Year of election dummies (10) 33
Education dummies (3) 33
Previous occupation dummies (4) 33
Municipality fixed effects 3
Observations 18,120 18,120 18,120 18,120
N. municipalities 8,078 8,078 8,078 8,078
R-squared 0.000 0.037 0.092 0.061
Table 3: Effect of Individual and Municipality Characteristics on Early Termination
Note: Population is the resident population at election. Old-age index is 100 times the ratio of population above 65 over population
below 14. Prop. population in labor force is the ratio of the active population (15-64) over the whole population. Income per capita is 
disposable income after taxes. Terms in office as mayor, including the current one. Years of experience in a municipal elective
office. Local born is 1 if the mayor is born in the same province. Political affiliation is the party to which the mayor belongs. Robust
standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the municipality level, in brackets.(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female 0.030*** 0.029*** 0.064*** 0.077***
[0.010] [0.011] [0.019] [0.023]
Prop. female in council -0.067*** 0.029
[0.022] [0.037]
Prop. female in mayor's coalition -0.051*** 0.019
[0.019] [0.035]
Prop. female in other lists 0.003 0.039
[0.015] [0.025]
Municipality fixed effects 33
Observations 16,563 12,959 16,563 12,959
N. municipalities 7,988 7,369 7,988 7,369
R-squared 0.094 0.093 0.070 0.080
Table 4: Mayor's Gender, City Councillors' Gender, and Early Termination 
Note: All regressions include mayor demographic characteristics (age, education dummies, years of experience in an elective
municipal office, dummy for term limit, number of terms as mayor, previous occupation dummies) municipality characteristics (macro-
region dummies, log population at election, log disposable income per capita, old-age index, labor force participation rate, firms per
capita, all as of 2005), election and council characteristics (number of seats in the council, proportion seats in the mayor's party,
proportion seats in the mayor's coalition, number of parties in the mayor's coalition, female share of voters), year dummies, political
party dummies, and average demographic characteristics of councilors in mayor's coalition and other lists (age, education dummies,
number of previous years in office, proportion not-employed). Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the municipality level, in
brackets.Coefficient on Female at the 
discontinuity point Controls Observations R-squared
Mean of the dep. var. 0.102




























0.068 3 1,084 0.132
[0.043]
Table 5: Regression Discontinuity Results, Mixed-Gender Races
Dependent variable: 1 if early termination
Linear regression
Linear regression on both sides of 
discontinuity
Two candidates, optimal bandwidth, linear 
regression on both sides of discontinuity
Half optimal bandwidth, linear regression on 
both sides of discontinuity
Linear regression on both sides of 
discontinuity
Two candidates, linear regression on both 
sides of discontinuity
Two candidates, linear regression on both 
sides of discontinuity
Optimal bandwidth, linear regression on both 
sides of discontinuity
Optimal bandwidth, linear regression on both 
sides of discontinuity
Two candidates, optimal bandwidth, linear 
regression on both sides of discontinuity
Two candidates, second order polynomial on 
both sides of discontinuity
Note: All regressions include mayor demographic characteristics (age, years of schooling, number of terms as mayor, previously not
employed), municipality characteristics (macro-region dummies, log population at election, log disposable income per capita, old-age
index, labor force participation rate, firms per capita, all as of 2005), female share of voters, and political party dummies. The optimally
chosen bandwidth is 0.25 (0.29 when only two candidates). Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the municipality level, in
brackets. 
Half optimal bandwidth, linear regression on 
both sides of discontinuity
Second order polynomial on both sides of the 
discontinuity point
Second order polynomial on both sides of 
discontinuity
Two candidates, second order polynomial on 
both sides of discontinuityDependent variable: Optimal bandwidth








Old-age index (in 2005) 0.003 0.046
Prop. population in labor force (in 2005) 0.001 -0.007
Income per capita (in 2005, euros) 320 631
Prop. female voters -0.001 -0.001
Left and center-left party 0.078 0.052
Right and center-right party -0.023 -0.010
Age -3.443*** -3.124***
Years of education 0.831*** 1.147***
Previously not employed 0.086*** 0.090**
Local born -0.037 -0.124**
Terms in office -0.125** -0.218***
Perceived Instability 0.003 0.011
Observations 2,037 1,028
Table 6: LLR Balance Tests, Mixed-Gender Races 
Note: Linear regression on both sides of discontinuity point. The optimally chosen bandwidth is 0.25 (0.29 when only two
candidates). Population is the resident population at election. Old-age index is the ratio of population above 65 over
population below 14. Prop. population in labor force is the ratio of the active population (15-64) over the whole population.
Terms in office as mayor, including the current one. Local born is 1 if the mayor is born in the same province. Party is the
party to which the mayor belongs. Perceived Instability computed predicting the ex-post survival probability using all the
observable characteristics available to the voters. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the municipality level, in
brackets. 
Coefficient on Female at the discontinuity point(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female 0.048** 0.092*** 0.134** 0.154** 0.134** 0.151**









Female * (Prop. female > 0 and ≤ 0.1) -0.114* -0.085
[0.063] [0.079]
Female * (Prop. female > 0.1 and ≤ 0.2) -0.092 -0.076
[0.060] [0.074]
Female * (Prop. female > 0.2 and ≤ 0.3) -0.140** -0.148**
[0.060] [0.075]
Female * (Prop. female > 0.3) -0.103* -0.100
[0.062] [0.076]
Municipality fixed effects 333
Observations 16,563 16,563 16,563 16,563 16,563 16,563
N. municipalities 7,988 7,988 7,988 7,988 7,988 7,988
R-squared 0.094 0.071 0.095 0.072 0.095 0.071
Table 7: Interactions between Mayor's Gender and Gender Composition of Council
Implied effect of a female mayor at the 
mean of Prop. female in council
Note: All regressions include also the main effects of the variables that are interacted with the gender of the mayor. Other controls:
mayor demographic characteristics (age, education dummies, years of experience in an elective municipal office, dummy for term
limit, number of terms as mayor, previous occupation dummies) municipality characteristics (macro-region dummies, log population
at election, log disposable income per capita, old-age index, labor force participation rate, firms per capita, all as of 2005), election
and council characteristics (number of seats in the council, percentage seats in the mayor's party, percentage seats in the mayor's
coalition, number of parties in the mayor's coalition, female share of voters), year dummies, political party dummies, and average
demographic characteristics of the councilors (age, education dummies, number of previous years in office, proportion not-
employed). Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the municipality level, in brackets.
Female * Prop. female in council
Female * (Prop. female in council > 0)
Implied effect of a female mayor when  
Prop. female in council > 0
Dependent variable: 1 if early termination(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean of the dep. var. 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100
Female 0.025 0.047 0.030*** 0.062*** 0.035*** 0.065***
[0.026] [0.048] [0.010] [0.019] [0.011] [0.019]
Female * South 0.114** 0.161**
[0.047] [0.073]
Female * Islands 0.011 -0.025
[0.045] [0.073]
Female * North-West -0.013 -0.015
[0.031] [0.062]






Municipality fixed effects 333
Region fixed effects 33
Observations 16,563 16,563 16,563 16,563 16,491 16,491
N. municipalities 7,988 7,988 7,988 7,988 7,985 7,985
R-squared 0.095 0.073 0.095 0.071 0.101 0.074
Table 8: Differences by Region and by Attitudes towards Working Women
Female * female labor force 
participation (demeaned)
Note: All regressions include mayor demographic characteristics (age, education dummies, years of experience in an elective municipal office,
dummy for term limit, number of terms as mayor, previous occupation dummies) municipality characteristics (macro-region dummies, log
population at election, log disposable income per capita, old-age index, labor force participation rate, firms per capita, all as of 2005), election and
council characteristics (number of seats in the council, proportion seats in the mayor's coalition, number of parties in the mayor's coalition,
proportion of councillors in the mayor's party, female share of voters), year dummies, political party dummies, proportion of female councilors, and
average demographic characteristics of the councilors (age, education dummies, number of previous years in office, proportion not-employed). The
macro-region of comparison is the Center. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the municipality level, in brackets. 
Female * index of positive attitudes 
towards working women













OLS OLS OLS OLS
A: Whole Sample
Mean of the dep. var. 0.032 0.032 0.067 0.067 0.032 0.067
Female -0.003 0.006 0.033*** 0.058*** -0.065 0.524***
[0.005] [0.011] [0.009] [0.017] [0.201] [0.122]
{-0.002} {0.026}
Prop. female in council -0.009 0.016 -0.058*** 0.013 -0.487 -1.130***
[0.014] [0.023] [0.018] [0.030] [0.533] [0.386]
{-0.011} {-0.044}
Municipality fixed effects 33
Observations 16,563 16,563 16,563 16,563
N. municipalities 7,988 7,988 7,988 7,988
R-squared 0.024 0.027 0.085 0.054
B: South Only
Mean of the dep. var. 0.048 0.048 0.142 0.142 0.048 0.142
Female -0.009 -0.008 0.128*** 0.199*** 0.103 0.869***
[0.018] [0.034] [0.039] [0.052] [0.415] [0.234]
{-0.001} {0.108}
Prop. female in council 0.008 0.018 -0.112** -0.009 -0.050 -1.341***
[0.035] [0.055] [0.055] [0.090] [0.930] [0.619]
{0.007} {-0.123}
Municipality fixed effects 33
Observations 3,972 3,972 3,972 3,972
N. municipalities 1,774 1,774 1,774 1,774
R-squared 0.033 0.041 0.106 0.103
1774
Pseudo R
2 :  0.128
Dependent variable
Table 9: Gender Differences by Type of Early Termination
Note: All regressions include mayor demographic characteristics (age, education dummies, years of experience in an elective municipal office, dummy for
term limit, number of terms as mayor, previous occupation dummies) municipality characteristics (log population at election, log disposable income per
capita, old-age index, labor force participation rate, firms per capita, all as of 2005), election and council characteristics (number of seats in the council,
percentage seats in the mayor's coalition, number of parties in the mayor's coalition, percentage of councillors in the mayor's party, female share of
voters), year dummies, political party dummies, and average demographic characteristics of the councilors (age, education dummies, number of previous





2 :  0.123
16,563












Mean of the dep. var. 1.558 7.048 7.905 31.221 2.232
Female -0.019 0.004 0.363** -0.065 -0.043
[0.179] [0.014] [0.153] [0.379] [0.049]
Prop. female in council -0.105 -0.021 0.547 -0.446 -0.050
[0.444] [0.035] [0.374] [1.038] [0.136]
Observations 15,641 15,641 15,641 15,641 15,641
N. municipalities 7,627 7,627 7,627 7,627 7,627
R-squared 0.043 0.422 0.288 0.196 0.220
B: South Only
Mean of the dep. var. 0.788 6.978 7.453 29.600 2.982
Female -0.333 0.026 0.408 0.405 -0.027
[0.310] [0.041] [0.391] [0.907] [0.137]
Prop. female in council -0.549 0.014 -1.140 -1.263 -0.133
[1.255] [0.079] [0.707] [2.174] [0.316]
Observations 3,918 3,918 3,918 3,918 3,918
N. municipalities 1,756 1,756 1,756 1,756 1,756
R-squared 0.043 0.340 0.331 0.220 0.198
Table 10: Mayor's Gender and Budget Variables
Dependent Variable
Note: All regressions include mayor demographic characteristics (age, education dummies, years of experience in an elective
municipal office, dummy for term limit, number of terms as mayor, previous occupation dummies) municipality characteristics (macro-
region dummies, log population at election, log disposable income per capita, old-age index, labor force participation rate, firms per
capita, all as of 2005), election and council characteristics (number of seats in the council, proportion seats in the mayor's coalition,
number of parties in the mayor's coalition, proportion of councillors in the mayor's party, female share of voters), year dummies,
political party dummies, and average demographic characteristics of the councilors (age, education dummies, number of previous
years in office, proportion not-employed). % Budget deficit computed as the absolute budget deficit divided by the total revenues. % 
expenditure welfare also includes expenditure for local transports. All budget variables computed as the mean within the term,
excluding election years. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the municipality level, in brackets.(1) (2) (3) (4)
Whole Sample Whole Sample South Only South Only
Mean of the dep. var. 0.096 0.096 0.184 0.184
Female 0.032*** 0.061*** 0.102** 0.141**
[0.010] [0.021] [0.040] [0.061]
Prop. female in council -0.059** -0.023 -0.112* -0.017
[0.023] [0.040] [0.063] [0.101]
% Budget deficit -0.131*** -0.261*** -0.067 -0.247**
[0.046] [0.065] [0.091] [0.115]
Log (revenue per capita) -0.011* -0.058*** -0.013 -0.083***
[0.007] [0.014] [0.017] [0.031]
% Expenditure for education (÷ 100) -0.099* 0.001 -0.096 -0.102
[0.051] [0.087] [0.174] [0.255]
% Expenditure for welfare (÷ 100) -0.012 -0.036 -0.096* -0.081
[0.019] [0.030] [0.049] [0.067]
% Expenditure for police (÷ 100) 0.418** -0.336 1.133*** 0.577
[0.162] [0.331] [0.430] [0.811]
Municipality fixed effects 33
Observations 15,641 15,641 3,918 3,918
N. municipalities 7,627 1,756
R-squared 0.094 0.075 0.124 0.105
Table 11: Effect of Budget and Mayor's Gender on Early Termination
Note: All regressions include mayor demographic characteristics (age, education dummies, years of experience in an elective municipal
office, dummy for term limit, number of terms as mayor, previous occupation dummies) municipality characteristics (macro-region dummies,
log population at election, log disposable income per capita, old-age index, labor force participation rate, firms per capita, all as of 2005),
election and council characteristics (number of seats in the council, proportion seats in the mayor's coalition, number of parties in the mayor's
coalition, proportion of councillors in the mayor's party, female share of voters), year dummies, political party dummies, proportion of female
councilors, and average demographic characteristics of the councilors (age, education dummies, number of previous years in office,
proportion not-employed). % Budget deficit computed as the absolute budget deficit divided by the total revenues. % expenditure welfare
also includes expenditure for local transports. All budget variables computed as the mean within the term, excluding election years. Robust
standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the municipality level, in brackets.Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Population 8,080 7,021 42,140 31 2,733,908
North-West 8,080 0.379 0.485 0 1
North-East 8,080 0.183 0.387 0 1
Center 8,080 0.124 0.330 0 1
South 8,080 0.221 0.415 0 1
Islands 8,080 0.093 0.290 0 1
Prop. population in labor force (in 2005) 7,959 0.410 0.058 0.16 0.609
Firms per capita (in 2005) 7,959 0.078 0.028 0.018 0.418
Old-age index (in 2005) 7,959 1.889 1.545 0 35
Income per capita (in 2005, euros) 7,959 13,547 3,048 5,013 44,949
Mayoral term characteristics
Number of seats in council 18,881 15.038 4.921 9 60
Prop. women in council 18,649 0.177 0.109 0 1
Number of parties in council 18,882 2.916 2.402 1 18
Prop. seats in mayor's coalition 17,117 0.697 0.097 0.446 1
Table A1: Municipalities - Summary Statistics
"Fixed" municipality characteristics
Note: Population is the resident population as of 1993. Prop. population in labor force is the ratio of active population (15-
64) over the whole population. Old-age index is the ratio of population above 65 over population below 14. Income per
capita is the disposable income after taxes.Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Female 18,882 0.067 0.249 0 1
Age 18,882 46.836 9.456 21 84
Term limit binding 18,882 0.252 0.434 0 1
Terms in office 18,882 1.599 0.799 1 5
Years of experience 18,882 6.314 4.844 0 18.047
Local born 18,565 0.859 0.348 0 1
Education
Primary 18,515 0.031 0.174 0 1
Lower secondary 18,515 0.120 0.325 0 1
Upper secondary 18,515 0.436 0.496 0 1
College 18,515 0.413 0.492 0 1
Previous occupation
Not employed 18,416 0.123 0.328 0 1
Professional 18,416 0.419 0.493 0 1
Entrepreneur 18,416 0.330 0.470 0 1
White-Collar 18,416 0.043 0.202 0 1
Others 18,416 0.085 0.279 0 1
Table A2: Mayors - Summary Statistics
Note: Terms in office as mayor, including the current one. Years of experience in a municipal elective office.
Local born is 1 if the mayor is born in the same province.